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TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN VITRUVIUS*  
 
SERAFINA CUOMO 
 
This paper is an experiment in taking a notion current in the history of modern 
science and technology – the notion of tacit knowledge - and seeing how it 
might work when applied to an ancient text like Vitruvius’ De architectura. Like 
any preliminary experiment, it is tentative and has no claim to generality, until 
and unless it be more widely applied and replicated, whether to De architectura 
or to other similar texts from antiquity. In that sense, this paper also attempts to 
be a manifesto for future studies. It may well be that a full recognition of the 
'tacit dimension' of those ancient treatises that are primarily devoted to 
communicating knowledge of how to make things (aka 'technical' treatises), will 
substantially change our understanding both of those texts, and of knowledge 
practices in Greek and Roman antiquity. 
I will first briefly describe what historians of science and technology today 
generally mean by ‘tacit knowledge’; then I will look closely at some passages in 
Vitruvius which, in my view, provide evidence of tacit knowledge. Finally, I will 
argue that employing the notion of tacit knowledge can not only help us 
 2 
understand and interpret the text, but also enrich our reconstruction of the 
context within which that text was read, used, and made sense of by its 
contemporaries. In other words, applying a notion from the history of science 
and technology could be of benefit both to the scholarship of De architectura as 
a literary product, and to the readings of it as historical evidence for ancient 
architecture, Roman ‘science’, and the Augustan period. 
 
WHAT IS TACIT KNOWLEDGE? 
 
The father founder of the notion of tacit knowledge was Michael Polanyi, who 
published The Tacit Dimension in 1967.1 In more recent times, however, the name 
most associated with tacit knowledge, in English-speaking academic circles at 
least, is Harry Collins, sometimes publishing with other sociologists of science 
such as Trevor Pinch. Because my aim is not to do a history of the concept of 
tacit knowledge, but to derive a hopefully useful interpretative category, I will 
mostly draw on Collins’s work and that of his co-authors. 
In a nutshell, tacit knowledge consists of the things that we know, and in 
particular the things that we know how to do, but that are very difficult to 
express in words. A typical example is riding a bike, or indeed most craft activities 
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such as carving stone, knitting, blowing glass, or even more quotidian ones, such 
as cooking. Most of the scholarly literature is about scientific practices, and 
specifically those, including experiments, which have a strong practical, technical 
or manual component.  
"Tacit knowledge has been shown to have an influence in, among other things, 
laser-building, the development of nuclear weapons, biological procedures, [...] 
veterinary surgery",  
and how to measure the quality of sapphires. (Collins (2001), 71) The realization 
that not all knowledge is verbal occurs particularly when knowledge has to be 
transferred, taught or communicated. Consequently, studies of tacit knowledge 
focus on training and apprenticing, or in general on learning and acquiring 
knowledge.  
While there is consensus about the general features of tacit or 'personal' 
knowledge, and various incarnations of it recur in, for instance, the recent 
scholarship on pedagogy,2 debate continues on some of the specifics. One of the 
main points of contention is whether all tacit knowledge can eventually be 
articulated into words, once it has been identified and made the explicit object of 
enquiry or discussion, or whether, as Polanyi believed, there will always be an 
element of tacit knowledge which is ineffable and irreducible in terms of spoken 
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communication. Historically, it would appear that the same knowledge once 
tacitly assumed can emerge and be articulated at a later stage, especially in a 
situation of conflict, dispute, or when there is a problem of replication. Whether 
that is the case for all the knowledge content implied in a scientific or technical 
practice, remains contested.  
Without taking sides on this particular point, what I think is a useful insight for 
our present purposes, is the idea that, if most knowledge-how is tacit, and a 
fortiori if some knowledge-how will always be tacit, the only effective way of 
transmitting it is through direct, personal contact and observation. To quote 
again from the scholarship on modern science:  
"The traditional or ‘algorithmical model’ treats the transmission of skills as a 
matter of the transfer of bits of information, such as could be expressed in 
written form or even in computer programs. Within such a model, all elements of 
a given skill can be exactly specified. Written instructions, recipes, and detailed 
manuals are, in principle, all that are necessary for the learning of a new skill." 
(Pinch, Collins, Carbone (1997), 101)  
Correspondingly, 'algorithmical' interpretations of Vitruvius' De architectura have 
approached the text as a ‘manual' of instruction, only to discover, with 
disappointment, that you cannot really use it on its own in order to learn how to 
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build things.3 The expectation that you could use ancient works about machines 
as instruction manuals, as you would with a booklet for Lego©, misses the point 
entirely, and not simply because Vitruvius' De architectura is a literary 
construction, with at best a tenuous connection with real life and real buildings. If 
the scholarship on tacit knowledge is correct, it may be simply - objectively, 
cognitively - impossible, even today, let alone in the first century CE, to produce 
a text that will give you 'perfect' algorithmic instructions to build anything.4 To 
quote from the same article again,  
"The newer ‘enculturational model’ [...] holds that most of the time the 
transmission of skills is best seen as a process of socialization – like attaining 
fluency in a language. Within this model, written instructions alone will never 
suffice in the learning of a skill. Skills must be learned in situ and certain tacit 
elements of a skill can only be passed on by direct instruction from a skilled 
practitioner." (Pinch, Collins, Carbone (1997), 101) 
Pinch, Collins and Carbone give us a useful distinction between the kind of 
communication that can be entirely confined to the written page, and the kind of 
communication of which the written page is only a part. When looking at so-
called ‘technical treatises’, we should be careful not to think that the transmission 
of the ‘technical’ content could ever be entirely resolved within the space of a 
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written text. More recently, Collins has introduced the idea of collective tacit 
knowledge. He argues that, even after you have mastered a skill, for instance, 
driving a car, you still have to master that skill within the context of use and 
especially the context of other people using that same skill, i.e. different tacit 
rules of traffic such as we find around the world. (Collins (2010), chapter 6) That 
puts even more constraints on our capacity, or the possibility tout court, to learn 
how to do things that are social things (and buildings definitely are social things) 
entirely from a book. 
So much for definitions – let us see if we can locate tacit knowledge in Vitruvius’ 
text. This is doubly experimental, in that the work done in the sociology of 
knowledge is based on the evidence of practices – on direct and sometimes 
participant observation of scientists’ behaviour and interviews with living people – 
rather than texts whose contexts can be reconstructed only conjecturally. 
Nevertheless, recognizing the presence of tacit knowledge as a limit not just of 
Vitruvius’ text, but of any text which aims to transmit knowledge, will help us gain 
insight into something that is highly problematic for Vitruvius himself, namely, 
how to express a knowledge practice through a text, or how to write about 
architecture at all.5 
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LOCATING TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN VITRUVIUS 
 
Once you start looking, it is striking how pervasive tacit knowledge appears to 
be. Almost every gap could now potentially be a presence – as could every 
passage where Vitruvius, while explaining some things, takes other things entirely 
for granted. This happens most obviously in those parts of the text where he 
describes machines, such as book 10.6 There, in the final book of the treatise, the 
reader is given instructions about how to put pieces together and in what 
sequence:  
"Two wooden beams proportional to the size of the load are procured. They are 
erected and fastened together at the top with a bolt and spread apart at the 
bottom; they are held upright by ropes tied to them at the top and fixed in the 
ground at intervals around them. A pulley-block, which some also call a 
rechamus, is fastened at the top. Two pulleys revolving on axles are inserted into 
the pulley-block: a traction-rope is passed around the upper pulley, then is let 
down and taken round the pulley in the lower pulley-block; then it is brought up 
again to the lowest pulley in the pulley-block at the top, and once again goes 
back down to the lower pulley-block, where it is tied off in a hole. The other end 
of the rope is brought back down between the feet of the machine. The socket-
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pieces in which the ends of the windlasses are fixed so that the axles may turn 
freely are secured to the flat, rear surfaces of the beams at the point where they 
spread apart. Near the ends of these windlasses are two holes arranged so that 
hand-spikes can be fitted into them. Iron pincers, of which the points fit into the 
holes drilled in stones, are fastened at the bottom of the lower rechamus. When 
one end of the rope is fastened to the windlass and the latter is turned using the 
hand-spikes, the rope winds itself round the windlass and becomes taut, and so 
raises the loads to the height and location of the work being undertaken. This 
type of machinery, which depends on the rotations of three pulleys, is called a 
trispastos."7  
Notice how Vitruvius ‘baptizes’ the machine itself, and 'translates' one name 
(trochlea) into another (rechamus), even though he proceeds to use both. (Cf. 
Fleury (2005) 282) Assigning a name to a thing eliminates the need for more 
ostensive communication, be it in the form of a longer description, or of visual 
aids. Notice also, on the other hand, the things that are left unsaid: we are told 
that a trochlea is what some call a rechamus, but not what the object is, nor what 
exactly fibula, axiculus, orbiculus, or chelonia are.8 Many terms for components of 
the machine are used as if the reader already knew what the corresponding 
things would look like and function as, and perhaps even how they would have 
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been made in their turn. The whole of the trispastos may be treated as new 
knowledge, but it is assembled from pieces that are taken as given. Moreover, 
knowledge of the processes by which the given pieces are assembled, is also in 
part taken as given. Some imply complex manual skills, such as fastening and 
fixing ropes or securing pieces in position; some present as more mathematically 
demanding, such as, at the very beginning of the passage, the stipulation that 
the two beams have to be in proportion to the weight that needs to be lifted. If 
not mathematics, here Vitruvius is at least assuming experienced eye-balling, 
otherwise the machine may just collapse under an excessive load.  
Let us look at another passage, here the description of how to build what we 
would call an Archimedean screw:  
"This device is constructed as follows: a wooden beam is selected and its length 
in feet should be measured out so as to equal its diameter in inches. It should 
then be made circular in section using compasses. The circumferences at the 
ends [of the beam] should be divided with compasses into eight segments 
comprising quadrants and octants; the lines should be located so that when the 
beam is laid down horizontally, those at either end line up exactly with each 
other; and the spacings marked along the length of the beam should equal an 
eighth of the circumference at the ends. Again, when the beam has been laid flat, 
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perfectly straight lines should be drawn from one end of it to the other. In this 
way equal spaces between the lines will be generated both around the 
circumference and along the length of the beam. So where the lines have been 
drawn along the length of the beam they will create intersections [with the 
circumferential lines], and precise points at the intersections. When these lines 
have been drawn correctly, one takes a thin strip of willow or one cut from agnus 
castus which, after being smeared with liquid pitch, is fixed at the first point of 
intersection. Then it is taken diagonally across to the next points of intersection 
of the longitudinal and circumferential lines; then, progressing in due order, it 
goes through each point and, winding around the beam, should be attached to 
each intersection; in this way, moving back from the first to the eighth point of 
intersection, it arrives at and is secured to the same line to which its end was 
fastened at the beginning. [...] More and more strips of wood coated with liquid 
pitch are fixed one over the other along the same grid, and should be built up 
until the total thickness is an eighth of the length. Wooden boards are placed 
above and around these strips and secured so as to protect the spiral. Then these 
boards are soaked with pitch and bound together with iron strips so that the 
impact of the water will not force them apart. The ends of the beam are shod 
with iron. To right and left of the screw, vertical supports are put in position at 
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either end, with cross-beams fixed on both sides. In these cross-beams iron 
sockets are inserted in which the pivots are housed; and so the screws turn, 
powered by the men pushing with their feet. The screw will be set up with an 
inclination that should correspond to the way in which a Pythagorean right-
angled triangle is drawn; that is, its length should be divided into five units, of 
which three indicate the height of the upper end of the screw, so that the 
distance from the perpendicular to the apertures at the bottom will be four units. 
A diagram is drawn at the appropriate place at the end of the book showing the 
procedure which should be followed."9  
The range of knowledge implicit in the building of this water-lifting device, which 
we know to have actually existed in antiquity,10 is even wider than what we found 
between the lines of the description of the trispastos, to the point where it 
evokes, beyond the individual presumably supervising the work, a team of people 
contributing to different aspects of the machine. The design of the screw is 
exquisitely mathematical, in the concrete, instrument-based Vitruvian sense of the 
term that we will discuss below. While for some aspects 'simple', the geometrical 
construction outlined here implies that the person doing it is an expert user of 
the compasses and presumably of a carpenter's square or similar instrument, so 
that they will know how to divide a circumference into equal parts and how to 
 12 
produce perfectly straight lines, both procedures that are taken for granted in the 
text. Moreover, we find the same tacit assumptions here as we did in the earlier 
passage, regarding manual skills such as fixing, attaching, and coating with pitch.  
Reading these absences of information helps us put together what Vitruvius 
expected, if not his reader, then at least a fellow builder, to know. In fact, one 
wonders whether the famous all-encompassing depiction of the ideal architect in 
book 1 is not at least to some extent a map of an expert builder's expected 
background/tacit knowledge. In book 1, the mathematical requirements of a 
good architect are all about how to use ruler and compasses, and geometrical 
constructions (as opposed to, say, demonstrations in the Euclidean mould) 
produced by means of instruments are found elsewhere in the treatise.11  
Mathematical constructions of physical artefacts with even more of a geometrical 
internal structure than the Archimedean screw are a particularly interesting 
further example of how tacit knowledge can be located in De architectura. Take 
the rose of the winds in book 1 (1.6.6-8, 12-13), or the analemma in book 9 
(9.1.1):  
"in any places where dials will have to be traced out, in that place the equinoctial 
shadow has to be taken, and if the nine parts of the gnomon will be as in Rome, 
an octet of shadow, let a line be traced on a level surface and from its middle let 
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[a line] be erected perpendicularly so that it is at a right angle, which is called 
gnomon, and from the line which will be flat on the line of the gnomon let nine 
spaces be divided with the compass, and in the place where is the mark of the 
ninth part let the centre be established where the letter A will be, and having 
opened the compass from that centre to the line of the flat surface where the 
letter B will be, let a circular line be drawn, which is called meridian. Next, of the 
nine parts between the flat surface and the centre of the gnomon, let 8 be taken 
and be marked on the line which is on the flat surface, where the letter C will be. 
This then will be the equinoctial shadow of the gnomon. And from that mark and 
the letter C through the centre where is the letter A let a line be drawn, where 
the equinoctial ray of the sun will be. At the same time, having opened the 
compass from the centre to the line of the flat surface let an area of equidistant 
width be marked where the letter E will be on the left side and I on the right 
[side] at the endpoints of the circular line, and through the centre a line has to 
be drawn, so that two semircircles be divided equally. This line then is called by 
mathematicians the horizon. [...] From the equinoctial centre with a distance 
[equivalent to the] summer [ray], let the circular line of the monthly circle be 
drawn, which is called monthly line (menaeus). Thus the design of an analemma 
will be obtained."12  
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It would be very difficult to build an analemma solely on the basis of Vitruvius' 
description, unless one already knew what the geometrical construction looked 
like (in other words, unless one already had a diagram), unless one had already 
seen a sundial, unless one already knew how to project the geometrical 
construction onto the plane of the chosen object which is to become a sundial, 
and, as in the previous cases, unless one already was an expert user of ruler and 
compasses. Once again, the absences in the text are explained by the ineffable, 
or at least unspoken, ability on the one hand to create a network of geometrical 
lines by means of instruments, and on the other, to embody that geometrical 
construction into a material in such a way as to produce an accurate yet 
serviceable artefact. 
The case of the analemma also throws into sharper relief the issue of the role of 
diagrams, and the emphasis they ought to be given in an interpretation which 
takes tacit knowledge on board. Ancient diagrams come in many guises: the 
lettered diagram of axiomatico-deductive geometry is an integral part of the 
proof, and of its shift from general to particular, to general again.13 The 
numbered diagram of problems aimed at measurement, such as we find in many 
papyri, is both an illustration and an aid to the understanding and memorization 
of the procedure.14 The diagram of a geometrical construction aimed at 
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constituting the substratum of an artefact is an explicitation, through 
visualization, of what the text can only gesture towards – it is basically 
encapsulated, but visually articulated, tacit knowledge.  
Diagrams in Vitruvius tend to intervene when the text is pushed to its limits,15 so 
that they appear in the treatise only occasionally,16 as if at that moment Vitruvius' 
awareness of the need to show, and not just tell, had been particularly amplified. 
When Vitruvius talks about the contrast between doing and talking in book 1,17 
according to Pierre Gros what he really wants to say is that words can be more 
effective than things. Consequently, Gros claims that diagrams would be an 
admission of the impotence of words over things, and that is why they are so 
sparingly used in De architectura.18 While I agree that diagrams are, as I said 
above, a 'special measure’-type of intervention onto the text, I am not sure that 
the need to show is necessarily perceived by Vitruvius as a failure, as opposed to, 
more neutrally, par for the course, especially when communicating to an 
audience which includes non-builders.19 Indeed, the very same passage in the 
first book about fabrica20 and ratiocinatio and quod significatur and quod 
significat, steers a very even course between the two pairs of terms, before 
culminating, after the description of the ideal architect and before starting to 
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subdivide architecture, in a passage where, in my view, Vitruvius lands 
unequivocally on one side of the fence: 
“For it is not as a consummate philosopher, nor as a fluent rhetorician, nor as a 
grammarian practised in the highest skills of his art that I have laboured to write 
these books, but as an architect who only dipped his foot in these studies. But 
with respect to the power of the art and the reasonings that are part of it, I 
promise, and hope, that by means of these books I will provide an unequivocally 
authoritative account not only for those who build but also for all men of 
culture.”21  
I think that the extent to which this passage may manifest an ‘inferiority complex’ 
has been overstated. 22 If we found something similar in Cicero or Varro, we 
would probably see it as straightforward captatio benevolentiae by way of 
exaggerated modesty, and I think that is a much more plausible reading. The 
contrast Vitruvius sets is not just with any philosopher, but with a summus 
philosophus, not just with any rhetorician, but with a rhetor disertus, and so on – 
qualified modesty, in other words. For his part, the terms framing what Vitruvius 
is doing with his architectural treatise are all very strong: potestas, maxima 
auctoritas and sine dubio. 
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On the whole, Vitruvius is well aware both of the power, and of the limitations of 
written-down, codified knowledge. Sometimes this realization is articulated quite 
explicitly. For instance, after describing the hydraulic organ, again in book 10, he 
says:  
"I have done my utmost to set out an arcane subject clearly in writing, but its 
mechanism is not simple or immediately understood by everybody apart from 
those who already have practical experience of these kinds of instruments. But if 
anyone has understood little from my account, he will certainly find that I really 
have laid out everything carefully and precisely when he becomes familiar with 
the device itself."23  
Notice that in the captatio benevolentiae above, the limits of writing are cast in 
terms of Vitruvius’ own area of expertise, which turns into an opportunity for 
highlighting by contrast, the areas in which he does have auctoritas. In the 
passage about the water-organ, on the contrary, the limits are presented as more 
or less ‘objective’ or neutral with regard to Vitruvius’ own literary skills – in other 
words, this is not a matter of not finding the right words, but of there being no 
right words, or no words that can really substitute exercitatio and familiarity with 
the actual artefact itself.  
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At other times, the discrepancy between words and the world emerges in a more 
subtle way. The design of temples in books 3 and 4, as well as the planning of 
theatres in book 5 (5.6 passim, 5.7.1), all presuppose the expert use of ruler and 
compasses (3.3 passim, 3.5 passim, 4.3 passim, 4.6 passim), which is assumed as 
background but not brought to the fore for discussion. Nonetheless, even when 
knowledge can be articulated and codified in sets of mathematical proportions, 
as it often is in these books, Vitruvius makes it very clear that geometrical 
constructions must adapt to the circumstances. Thus, tacit knowledge slips in 
through the ever-present factors of uncertainty or inaccuracy, such as the nature 
of the site, the scale of the work, in its turn a function of money and time; and in 
the case of temples, what god one is building for. A good architect should know 
how to adapt, which in mathematical terms amounts to knowing how to tweak 
and what to tweak,24 but this is precisely the sort of knowledge that cannot be 
written down in a treatise:  
"Nothing should preoccupy the architect more than that buildings should 
incorporate exactly the measurements implicit in the proportional system based 
on a predetermined unit. Therefore, when the system of modular relationships 
has been established and the relative dimensions worked out by calculation, it 
requires an acute mind to consider the nature of the site, its use and appearance, 
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and to make adjustments by means of additions or subtractions when something 
in the modular system must be augmented or reduced so that it can be seen to 
be designed correctly without damaging its appearance. […] Therefore, since what 
is real may seem false and some things may turn out to be different from how 
they appear to the eyes, I do not think that there is any room to doubt that 
subtractions or additions should be made to cater for the characteristics and 
exigencies of sites, but in such a way that the buildings leave nothing to be 
desired. But such results cannot be achieved by precepts alone but also require 
fine judgement (acumen)."25  
Acumen belongs to a family of crucial but underdefined notions such as 
venustas,26 which may be immediately identifiable by the members of a certain 
knowledge community, but are very difficult to explain to an outsider. A modern 
equivalent could be the notion of 'elegance' in a mathematical proof. A trained 
mathematician will recognize it, but they will not be able to explain it to you 
unless you are one of them, at which point you will not need the explanation 
anymore because you just know. Although venustas has to do with symmetria 
and thus can to an extent be expressed in mathematical terms, it cannot entirely 
be reduced to mathematical proportions, because those proportions will have to 
be adapted to the circumstances, as explained above. It could be argued that 
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some crucial but somewhat under-determined Vitruvian epistemic virtues such as 
ingenium, acumen, sollertia are a sort of short-hand for more extensive but tacit, 
indefinable, moral and cognitive behaviours and approaches which are learned or 
almost 'absorbed' non-verbally when someone (an architect) is enculturated 
within a knowledge community (the community of expert builders). These terms 
appear to be often used by Vitruvius to fill the explanatory gap opened by the 
limits of the text in accounting for how things get built successfully.27  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Identifying the presence of tacit knowledge in Vitruvius' treatise, in the way that I 
have sketched in this article, may help us in various ways better to understand 
the text and its author.  
Firstly, assuming tacit knowledge rather than incompetence or poor literary skills 
may help explain ‘gaps’ in the account, including explaining why the machines 
described often ‘do not work’.28 
Secondly, inserting tacit knowledge into the picture may throw further light on 
the problem of transmission of technology, and on the limits of the text in that 
transmission.29 It seems to me that there is perhaps an excessive tendency in the 
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scholarship to attribute transmission of the knowledge found in De architectura 
or technical knowledge in general, to textual sources. (See e.g. Novara (2005), 
chapter 1; Courrént (2011), 43-50) For instance, this tendency underlies, in my 
view, the postulated existence of ‘subliterary handbooks’. (Oleson (2004) 66) I find 
the very term 'subliterary' problematic - any text is, in its own way, 'literary', 
unless we envisage a highly visual text, akin to the Artemidorus papyrus or 
indeed a Lego© booklet, but, arguably, even that would not have been sufficient 
to transmit knowledge all by itself, any more than, say, Leonardo da Vinci's 
codexes enable us to reconstruct his machines without having to fill any gaps. 
Moreover, I am skeptical about postulating the existence of texts for which we 
have no evidence and which, in a sense, do not need to exist, once we take on 
board the fact that knowledge, especially technical knowledge, is transmitted 
mostly extra-textually. Indeed, Burkhard Meißner points out that the idea of 
writing down the content of crafts only originated in the 19th century. Until then, 
one educated imitatively, through Mitmachen-Lassen, oral discourse and personal 
demonstration,30 a picture which, incidentally, fits perfectly with the findings of 
scholars studying transmission of technology and the role of tacit knowledge 
even today.  
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Thus, assuming tacit knowledge emphasizes the importance of people as sources 
of information, even outside the context of what we would recognize as formal 
training, and highlights the importance of those passages in De architectura31 
and indeed other texts which imply that the actual presence of an expert is 
paramount. (E.g. Apollodorus, Siege-matters 137-138 (ed. Wescher, tr. D. 
Whitehead)  
Thirdly, presupposing tacit knowledge helps us clarify what role Vitruvius 
envisaged for himself. I think anybody would agree that De architectura is not 
just about architecture, but also about the architect, and more specifically about 
Vitruvius. When in book 1 he distinguishes between doing something and 
thinking or indeed talking about what you have done, and he says that the first 
thing is what most craftsmen do, while the second thing is what one shares with 
the educated, I doubt he is declaring he wants to only do the latter.32 Vitruvius 
never forgets where he is coming from. As I understand it, De architectura is 
ideally to be read along with the direct communication and guidance of an 
architect - in the case of the Emperor, Vitruvius himself. He does not eliminate 
the role of the architect as a personal, real-life teacher and guide - and why 
would he? - rather, the personal role of the architect is retained alongside the 
creation of a text. The text gives the architect auctoritas33 but does not substitute 
 23 
him, and indeed, if tacit knowledge is a nigh-universal observable cognitive 
phenomenon, even the most perfect text could not entirely substitute the expert. 
I would re-read the end of book 10 in precisely this light: not even the best 
military engines can completely substitute the 'human factor' embodied by the 
architect and his sollertia. (10.16.1-2, 12) 
Assuming tacit knowledge in De architectura also makes it clear that, for all the 
emphasis on Vitruvius as the author, this is also about a group - a move which 
takes us outside the text. The notion of tacit knowledge is inseparable from that 
of a knowledge community within which a person is enculturated (to use Pinch’s 
words). Hence Vitruvius’ great interest in defining the architect against other 
categories, and distinguishing the good architect from the bad one. De 
architectura presupposes a group or community of builders: in the preface to 
book 1, when he talks about his own service under Julius Caesar, it is significant, I 
think, that Vitruvius lists all his colleagues, and specifies that they did things 
together.34 At the same time, I would not want to argue that the community of 
architects is completely separate from the non-architects. On the contrary, it is 
precisely because architects and docti, or even architects and the general public, 
share something, that it makes sense for a treatise like De architectura to be 
written. As already pointed out by Elisa Romano and Pierre Gros, the preface to 
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book 1 insists on the fact that Augustus has a great interest in building, and 
already builds on a large scale. At the end of the preface Vitruvius says that he 
wrote the treatise so that Augustus could have knowledge of buildings to be 
erected in the future, and of buildings already done.( Vitruvius 1.preface.3. Cf. e.g. 
Romano (1987), chapter 1; Gros (1994); McEwen (2003) chapters 2 and 4) 
Augustus is not the only 'lay builder' looming large in the treatise: the patres 
familiarum also have something in common with the architect, but need to be 
guided and educated in their choices.35  
In sum, while Vitruvius was certainly not aware of tacit knowledge as such, since 
the concept was not articulated until the 20th century, he was aware of the limits 
of the text. Acknowledging tacit knowledge means that we acknowledge that the 
limits of the text are not necessarily Vitruvius' limits, but that there are what we 
could call objective limits. Ways Vitruvius has of addressing them include 
diagrams or recourse to personal virtues such as ingenium, sollertia, acumen, or 
general values, such as decor or venustas, which even when defined are to a 
great extent implicitly understood.36  
In my view, Vitruvius did not perceive the limits of the text in a completely 
negative way, because the explanatory gap left by the text could then be filled by 
the live presence of the expert. Mapping tacit knowledge can give us an idea of 
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what an enculturated architect was expected to know - ruler and compasses 
constructions, for instance - but also, fundamentally, that the architect was 
expected to adapt his knowledge to the circumstances, and this was something 
that no book could tell you, a limit of the text that, for all his literary resonances 
and educated allusions, Vitruvius seems not to see as a failure, but as an 
opportunity. 
Acknowledging collective tacit knowledge means that we recognize that writing 
down the knowledge of building in a corpus confers auctoritas on the architects 
and makes them share, with limitations, in the culture of the docti, but also that it 
exposes the fact that the docti cannot entirely share in the culture of the 
architects either. (Cf. Gros (1994), 75-90) it reminds us, historians and philologists, 
professionals of the word, that writing or even speaking are not everything, and 
that they are not necessarily or not always prior to other forms of 
communication. 
To quote from modern scholarship again:  
"Over the last three decades, an alternative account of scientific knowledge has 
gradually emerged to rival the traditional view. In the latter, scientific knowledge 
and science-based technology are universal, independent of context, impersonal, 
public, and cumulative; the practice of science is (or ought to be) a matter of 
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following the rules of scientific method. The alternative account emphasizes 
instead the local, situated, person-specific, private, and noncumulative aspects of 
scientific knowledge. [...] Explicit knowledge is information or instructions that can 
be formulated in words or symbols and, therefore, can be stored, copied, and 
transferred by impersonal means, such as in written documents or computer files. 
Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge that has not been (and 
perhaps cannot be) formulated explicitly and, therefore, cannot effectively be 
stored or transferred entirely by impersonal means. [...] Because tacit knowledge 
is transmitted person to person, there are greater barriers to the spread of 
competence than the traditional view might lead us to expect. If science rests 
upon specific, hard-to-acquire, tacit skills, then there is a sense in which scientific 
knowledge is always local knowledge." (MacKenzie & Spinardi (1995), 44-6)  
Ultimately, we may be in need of revising our entire notion of knowledge, tacit or 
otherwise, so as not to impose on Vitruvius and on De architectura a vision of 
science that not only did not exist in antiquity, but has probably never existed 
anywhere.  
                                   
* Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from De architectura are from the 
Belles Lettres editions, and all the English translations are a slightly modified 
version of the Penguin translation. 
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1 Some ideas were already adumbrated in his Personal Knowledge (1958). Polanyi 
was a physical chemist. 
2 E.g. Scribner & Cole (1973). More recently, Tehrani & Riede (2008). 
3 E.g. see the references in Tosi (1994). 
4 Unless, of course, you are building Lego©, and even then one could argue that 
some information comes from the context or from a helping parent who has 
been there before, rather than the text. 
5 Cf. e.g. Vitruvius, 4.preface.1: “Cum animadvertissem, Imperator, plures de 
architectura praecepta voluminaque commentariorum non ordinata sed incepta 
uti particulas errabundas reliquisse, dignam et utilissimam rem putavi tantae 
disciplinae corpus ad perfectam ordinationem perducere et praescriptas in 
singulis voluminibus singulorum generum qualitates explicare.” On this see e.g. 
Pierre Gros’s commentary ad locum in his edition of book IV (Les belles lettres 
1992); McEwen (2003) chapter 1. 
6 The entire section on ballistae is a prime example of tacit knowledge implicit in 
the assemblage of the various parts, whose general shape must be already 
familiar, as must be choice of material – the only thing that Vitruvius is awovedly 
talking about is relative proportions (10.11 passim). For a valuable discussion of 
the same problem, but in different terms see Fleury (2005). 
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7 Vitruvius, 10.2.1-3 (ed. Fleury with modifications): "Tigna duo ad onerum 
magnitudinem ratione expendiuntur. A capite [a] fibula coniuncta et in imo 
divaricata eriguntur, funibus in capitibus conlocatis et circa dispositis erecta 
retinentur. Alligatur in summo troclea, quem etiam nonnulli rechamum dicunt. In 
trocleam induntur orbiculi per axiculos versationes habentes. Per orbiculum 
traicitur ductarius funis, deinde demittitur et traducitur circa orbiculum trocleae 
inferioris. Refertur autem ad orbiculum imum trocleae superioris et ita descendit 
ad inferiorem et in foramine eius religatur. Altera pars funis refertur inter imas 
machinae partes. In quadris autem tignorum posterioribus, quo loci sunt 
divaricata, figuntur chelonia in quae coiciuntur sucularum capita, ut faciliter axes 
versentur. Eae suculae proxime capita habent foramina bina ita temperata ut 
vectes in ea convenire possint. Ad rechamum autem imum ferrei forfices 
religantur, quorum dentes in saxa forata accommodantur. Cum autem funis habet 
caput ad suculam religatum et vectes ducentes eam versant, funis involvendo 
circum suculam extenditur et ita sublevat onera ad altitudinem et operum 
conlocationes. Haec autem ratio machinationis, quod per tres orbiculos 
circumvoluitur, trispastos appellatur." 
8 See the remarks on fibula in Philippe Fleury’s commentary ad locum in the 
Belles Lettres edition of book X (1986) : “une identification précise de la fibula 
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peut être parfois difficile”; Corso & Romano’s commentary ad locum to their 
Italian translation (Torino 1997): “V. distingue I componenti di una carrucola […], 
ma non dice niente sul materiale di cui sono composti […] né della disposizione 
delle pulegge quando ce n’è piú d’una.” 
9 Vitruvius, 10.6.1-4: "Eius autem ratio sic expeditur. Tignum sumitur, cuius tigni 
quanta paratur pedum longitudo tanta digitorum expeditur crassitudo. Id ad 
circinum rotundatur. In capitibus circino dividentur circumitiones eorum 
tetrantibus et octantibus in partes octo, eaeque lineae ita conlocentur ut, plano 
posito tigno, utriusque capitis ad libellam lineae inter se respondeant, et quam 
magna pars sit octava circinationis tigni, tam magna spatia decidantur in 
longitudinem. Item, tigno plano conlocato, lineae ab capite ad alterum caput 
perducantur ad libellam convenientes. [...] Eo modo quantum progreditur oblique 
spatium et per octo puncta, tantundem et longitudine procedit ad octavum 
punctum. Eadem ratione per omne spatium longitudinis et rotunditatis singulis 
decusationibus oblique fixae regulae per octo crassitudinis divisiones involutos 
faciunt canales et iustam cocleae naturalemque imitationem. Ita per id vestigium 
aliae super alias figuntur unctae pice liquida, et exaggerantur ad id uti 
longitudinis octava pars fiat summa crassitudo. Supra eas circumdantur et 
figuntur tabulae quae pertegant eam involutionem. Tunc eae tabulae pice 
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saturantur et lamminis ferreis conligantur, ut ab aquae vi ne dissolvantur. Capita 
tigni ferrea. Dextra autem ac sinistra cocleam tigna conlocantur in capitibus 
utraque parte habentia transversaria confixa. In his foramina ferrea sunt inclusa 
inque ea inducuntur styli; et ita cocleae hominibus calcantibus faciunt versationes. 
Erectio autem eius ad inclinationem sic erit conlocanda uti, quemadmodum 
Pythagoricum trigonum orthogonium describitur, sic id habeat responsum, id est 
uti dividatur longitudo in partes V, earum trium extollatur caput cocleae; ita erit 
ab perpendiculo ad imas naris spatium earum partium IIII. Qua ratione autem 
oporteat id esse, in extremo libro eius forma descripta est in ipso tempore." 
10 See e.g. Andrew Wilson's entries in Oleson (2009). 
11 Vitruvius 1.1.4, cf. 1.2.2. Book 9 preface.4-5 starts with Plato's geometrical 
construction of a square double a given one; having said twice that the double 
square cannot be found through numbers, Vitruvius gives the construction 
grammicis rationibus. Vitruvius 9.preface.6 is about Pythagoras’ geometrical 
instrument (norma): “Item Pythagoras normam sine artificis fabricationibus 
inventam ostendit, et quod magno labore fabri normam facientes vix ad verum 
perducere possunt, id rationibus et methodis emendatum ex eius praeceptis 
explicatur.” Vitruvius 9.preface.13: mentions of Archytas and Eratosthenes on the 
duplication of the cube, thus again a geometrical problem and a geometrical 
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instrument (the mesolabe). Diagrams (formae) at the bottom of the page are 
mentioned at 9.preface.5 and 9.preface.8.  
12 Vitruvius, 9.7.1-7 (ed. Fleury with modifications, tr. mine): "in quibuscumque 
locis horologia erunt describenda, eo loci sumenda est aequinoctialis umbra, et si 
erunt quemadmodum Romae gnomonis partes novem, umbrae octonae, 
describatur linea in planitia et e media pros orthas erigatur ut sit ad normam 
quae dicitur gnomon, et a linea quae erit planitia in linea gnomonis circino 
novem spatia dimetiantur, et quo loco nonae partis signum fuerit centrum 
constituatur ubi erit littera A, et diducto circino ab eo centro ad lineam planitiae 
ubi erit littera B, circinatio circuli describatur, quae dicitur meridiana. Deinde ex 
novem partibus, quae sunt a planitia ad gnomonis centrum, VIII sumantur et 
signentur in linea quae est in planitia ubi erit littera C. Haec autem erit gnomonis 
aequinoctialis umbra. Et ab eo signo et littera C per centrum ubi est littera A 
linea perducatur, ubi erit solis aequinoctialis radius. Tunc a centro diducto circino 
ad lineam planitiae aequilatatio signetur ubi erit littera E sinisteriore parte et I 
dexteriore in extremis lineae circinationis, et per centrum perducenda linea, ut 
aequa duo hemicyclia sint divisa. Haec autem linea a mathematicis dicitur 
horizon. [...] E centro aequinoctiali intervallo aestivo circinatio circuli menstrui 
agatur, qui menaeus dicitur. Ita habebitur analemmatos deformatio." 
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13 See Nezt (1999). 
14 See [omissis]. 
15 Which I think is in line with Gros (1996), even though he does not use the term 
'tacit knowledge'. Gros remarks (1996), 26, that there are only nine diagrams in 
the whole treatise – this echoed by Haselberger (1989), 69-70. 
16 Cf. in addition to the references in footnote 17, Vitruvius 3.3.13; 3.4.5; 3.5.8; 
5.4.1, 5.5.6; 8.5.3; 10.6.4. 
17 Vitruvius 1.1.1-3. See e.g. Gros (1982) 670-1; Romano (1987), 52-9; Callebat 
(1994), 35-6. 
18 Gros (1996) n21, 25-7: "En général Vitruve ne recourt à un complément 
graphique que s’il éprouve quelque difficulté à exprimer clairement la démarche 
à suivre pour construire un élément de structure ou de décor. […] Il apparâit ainsi 
que la figure ne prend le relais du texte que dans les cas très ponctuels où 
Vitruve a conscience d’avoir atteint les limites de sa formulation et/ou de sa 
conceptualisation. […] En ce sens le passage du graphisme à l’écriture constitue 
pour Vitruve l’un des moyens – le principal sans doute – d’élever la praxis 
architecturale au niveau d’une ars liberalis […]. Dans cette perspective tout retour 
au dessin est, à certains égards, un aveu d’impuissance et va directement à 
l’encontre de l’ambition de l’auteur du traité.”). 
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19 Gros (1996) 27: “Transcrit dans la conception vitruvienne, ce principe revient à 
affirmer que la parole bien exprimée vaut et dans certain cas surpasse l’artefact 
même à laquelle elle se réfère.”  
20 The definition of fabrica at Vitruvius 1.1.1 hints towards tacit knowledge, with 
the crucial difference that fabrica is described very much in terms of individual 
experience, whereas tacit knowledge, as we are discussing it here, implies a 
community. 
21 Vitruvius 1.1.18: “Namque non uti summus philosophus nec rhetor disertus nec 
grammaticus summis rationibus artis exercitatus, sed ut architectus his litteris 
imbutus haec nisus sum scribere. De artis vero potestate quaeque insunt in ea 
ratiocinationes, polliceor, uti spero, his voluminibus non modo aedificantibus, sed 
etiam omnibus sapientibus cum maxima auctoritate me sine dubio praestaturum.” 
Cf. Novara (2005), 125-6. 
22 E.g. Romano (1987), 81-7, indirectly qualified at 97-8 but also by the passage 
6.preface.3-4 cited on p.168; see also Gros (1994), 86; Novara (2005), 11. 
23 Vitruvius 10.8.6: "Quantum potui niti, ut obscura res per scripturam dilucide 
pronuntiaretur contendi, sed haec non est facilis ratio neque omnibus expedita 
ad intellegendum praeter eos qui in his generibus habent exercitationem. Quodsi 
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qui parum intellexerit ex scriptis, cum ipsam rem cognoscet, profecto inveniet 
curiose et subtiliter omnia ordinata." 
24 Cf. Vitruvius 6.3.11. See also usus in contrast to e.g. symmetria, 5.6.7, and the 
similarity between this passage and that on catapults in book 10, where, after a 
list of relative specifications (all relative to a module), Vitruvius says that to these 
proportions one applies adiectiones and detractiones (10.10.6). 
25 Vitruvius, 6.2.1, 4: "Nulla architecto maior cura esse debet, nisi uti 
proportionibus ratae partis habeant aedificia rationum exactiones. Cum ergo 
constituta symmetriarum ratio fuerit et conmensus ratiocinationibus explicati, tum 
etiam acuminis est proprium providere ad naturam loci aut usum aut speciem 
<detractionibus aut> adiectionibus temperaturas <et> efficere, cum de 
symmetria sit detractum aut adiectum, uti id videatur recte esse formatum in 
aspectuque nihil desideretur. […] Cum ergo quae sunt vera falsa videantur et 
nonnulla aliter quam sunt oculis probentur, non puto oportere esse dubium quin 
ad locorum naturas aut necessitates detractiones aut adiectiones fieri debeant, 
sed ita uti nihil in his operibus desideretur. Haec autem etiam ingeniorum 
acuminibus, non solum doctrinis efficiuntur." On detractionibus aut adiectionibus 
see Callebat’s commentary to the Belles Lettres edition, 90. On the relevance to 
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these issues of the notion of kairos, see Corso & Romano’s commentary ad 
locum to their Italian translation, cit. Cf. also Vitruvius, 5.6.7. 
26 Vitruvius e.g. 1.2.3, 1.3.2, 2.3.4, 2.8.1, 3.3.13, 3.5.11, 4.1.6, 4.2.2, 5.1.10, 6.3.11, 
7.preface.18. Cf. also elegans: 1.2.2, 1.3.2; voluptas (1.2.2); decor: 1.2.4. 
27 E.g. Vitruvius 5.6.7, 6.2.1, 6.3.11, 10.16.12, or see the pairing with disciplina at 
1.1.3. On sollertia see e.g. Romano (1987), 166-7. 
28 This adumbrated by Fleury, e.g. (1994), 202-3 and (1996), 60, except that he 
thinks that the machines do work.  
29 This does not negate the fact that Vitruvius is aware of the crucial role played 
by writing in the transmission of knowledge: see above all 7.preface.1-3. 
Nevertheless, all the examples in that passage are about knowledge-that (history, 
physics, philosophy) and its insistence on memoria chimes in with the emphasis 
in the modern literature on tacit knowledge on loss of knowledge through failed 
mechanisms of transmission, see e.g. MacKenzie & Spinardi (1995). 
30 Meißner (2003), 153. Cf. also the remarks in Formisano (2001) chapter 2.I. 
31 Cf. Novara (2005), 20-34 for a different kind of claim about the presence of the 
author. 
32 Vitruvius 1.1.15: “Igitus in hac re Pytheos errasse videtur quod non animadvertit 
ex duabus rebus singulas artes esse compositas, ex opere et eius ratiocinatione, 
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ex his autem unum proprium esse eorum qui singulis rebus sunt exercitati: id est 
operis effectus, alterum commune cum omnibus doctis” – echoes of the 
distinction between the signified and the signifier at 1.1.3. 
33 Vitruvius 1.1.2: litterae do not necessarily help you do a better job, but without 
them you do not get auctoritas=recognition or prestige. The idea that even very 
good architects may lack auctoritas basically through no fault of their own 
emerges again  at 3.preface.1. Cf. also on auctoritates Vitruvius 5.preface.1. 
34 Vitruvius 1.preface.2: “Itaque cum M. Aurelio et P. Minidio et Cn. Cornelio ad 
apparationem balistarum et scorpionum reliquorumque tormentorum refectionem 
fui praesto et cum eis commoda accepi” (italics mine). In book 2, when he talks 
about origins, he indicates as a milestone the moment when, having reached a 
certain level of proficiency in building, the people who were more engaged and 
keen on building identified themselves as builders (fabros, 2.1.6). 
35 Vitruvius 6.preface.5-7, see also 3.preface.3. Patres familiarum also at 
10.preface.2. Cf. Romano (1987) 181; with more qualifications Novara (2005), 17; 
cf. also ibid. 157-9 on le retour à l’action implicit in the last book, 166-7.  
36 E.g. décor at Vitruvius, I.2.5, see the remarks in Geertman (1994), 21-2. 
